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DEMOCRACY, SCIENCE, AND FREE TRADE:
RISK REGULATION ON TRIAL AT THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Robert Howse*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most common critiques of globalization is that it in
creasingly constrains the ability of democratic communities to make
unfettered choices about policies that affect the fundamental welfare
of their citizens, including those of health and safety, the environment,
and consumer protection. Traditionally, free trade rules were about
constraining border measures such as tariffs and quantitative restric
tions on imports. Increasingly, however, such rules include require
ments and constraints addressed directly to domestic regulation. For
example, a country's policies with respect to intellectual property
rights or its regulatory approach to network industries, such as tele
communications, may now be fundamentally shaped by rules that are
made and interpreted at the international level. One of the most visi
ble and controversial areas where trade rules constrain regulatory di
versity is that of food safety.
The World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS
Agreement"), negotiated in the Uruguay Round and enacted �n 1994,
requires that countries either adopt harmonized international stan
dards or, if they choose to maintain stricter regulations, base these on
risk assessment, scientific principles, and scientific evidence. The SPS
Agreement also requires that the regulations adopted be the least
trade-restrictive available to achieve the desired level of protection.
The above provisions apply even to nondiscriminatory regulations that
would not run afoul of the Most Favored Nation and National Treat
ment provisions of the GATT itself. The SPS Agreement also pro
hibits "arbitrary" and "unjustified" distinctions in levels of protection
in situations that are comparable, where these distinctions lead to
"discrimination" or "disguised restriction on trade."
Such strictures appear to provide fuel for criticism that globaliza
tion suffers a "democratic deficit." As two critics put it, "[t]he essence
*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1980, LL.B. 1989,
Toronto; LL.M. 1990, Harvard.- Ed. Thi s Article was initially presented at a faculty work
shop at Harvard Law School. I am grateful for comments and reactions from Jerry Weiner,
Ben Kingsbury, Kip Viscusi, Christine Jolls, Bill Alford , David Chamy, and other partici
pants at the Workshop, as well as Rick Lempert. All errors and omi ssi ons are my sole re
sponsibility .
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of free trade is deregulation . . . . Trade regimes like NAFfA, the
GATT, and the WTO already have enormous clout in determining
environmental, agricultural, land-use, health and, food safety rules."1
The beef hormones dispute between the United States and the
European Union may seem to exemplify how the SPS provisions rob
democratic communities of sovereign regulatory choices. The United
States successfully challenged at the WTO an EU ban on beef injected
with natural and synthetic growth hormones. The ban directly re
sponded to widespread fears of citizens about the risks presented by
such hormones, particularly if they might be present in foodstuffs at
levels beyond those that would occur if the hormones had been ad
ministered in accordance with good veterinary practice. The ban,
however, was found by a WTO panel not to be based on a risk assess
ment that followed scientific principles and procedures, a result up
held by the WTO Appellate Body (on narrower grounds to be dis
cussed later in this essay).
The present essay is intended as a response to the "democratic"
challenge to the SPS provisions and their interpretation by the WTO
dispute settlement organs. I argue that these provisions can be, and
should be, understood not as usurping legitimate democratic choices
for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of rational demo
cratic deliberation about risk and its control. There is more to democ
racy than visceral response to popular prejudice and alarm; democ
racy's promise is more likely to be fulfilled when citizens, or at least
their representatives and agents, have comprehensive and accurate in
formation about risks, and about the costs and benefits associated with
alternative strategies for their control. If rational deliberation is an
important element in making democratic outcomes legitimate, then
providing some role for scientific principles and evidence in the regu
latory process may enhance, rather than undermine, democratic con
trol of risk. On the other hand, democracy also requires respect for
popular choices, even if different from those that would be made in an
ideal deliberative environment by scientists and technocrats, if the
choices have been made in awareness of the facts, and the manner that
they will impact on those legitimately concerned has been explicitly
considered.
II.

TRADE RULES THAT CONSTRAIN DOMESTIC REGULATION:

THE CHALLENGE TO THE CONVENTIONAL CASE FOR FREE TRADE
There are many respects in which enhanced access to foreign mar
kets can require regulatory changes in those countries, and there are

1. TONY CLARKE & MAUDE BARLOW, MAI: THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVEsTMENT AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 81 {1997).
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also the various transaction costs to trade from regulatory diversity.2
The entanglement of trade liberalization commitments with explicit
strictures on domestic regulation, however, raises important chal
lenges to the conventional case that trade liberalization, generally
speaking, enhances both domestic and global welfare. It had often
been argued that a country effectively can pursue any given regulatory
goal by means other than protectionist trade restrictions such as tar
iffs, and thus, the removal of such restrictions in no way reduces the
capacity of governments to achieve welfare-maximizing regulatory
outcomes for their citizens.3
Thus, in commenting on the original General Agreement on Tar
iffs and Trade ("GATT") Agreement, conventional trade law scholars
characteristically have emphasized the extent to which free trade
commitments do not reduce regulatory heterogeneity.4 The main ob2. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY {1995) (especially chapter one "National Regulation in the Global
Economy").
3. See, e.g., E.U. Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem, On the 'Do
mestic Policy Functions' of International Trade Rules, in 1 THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 121-51 (Robert Howse ed., 1998).
Economic theory demonstrates that trade restrictions almost always lower the national eco
nomic welfare of the country imposing the restrictions . . . . For instance, import tariffs not
only redistribute income from consumers to the protected industries and produce revenue
for the government, but also create important 'deadweight losses' resulting in a net-loss of
national economic welfare. Standard economic analysis recognizes only a few narrowly de
fined exceptions where 'optimal tariffs', 'infant industry protection' or 'strategic protection'
of oligopolistic industry might theoretically improve national welfare. But these exceptional
conditions are difficult to establish in practice and are hardly ever actually ascertained in de
cisionmaking about trade. Most economic arguments for trade protection turn out to origi
nate in market failures in the domestic economy- such as endogenous divergences between
private and social costs (e.g. in the case of monopolies and 'external effects') or policy im
posed distortions leading to inefficient production patterns - which can be corrected most
efficient by domestic policies intervening directly at and as close as possible to the domestic
distortion . . . without introducing additional by-product distortions and unnecessarily re
ducing the gains from trade.

Id.

at 122 {footnote omitted). While, as has been long understood by free traders {indeed
since Adam Smith himself), removing trade restrictions has distributive consequences, with
some domestic constituencies gaining and others losing, the overall gains are greater than
the losses to the losers, thus allowing full compensation to losers, were such a policy to be
dictated by the democratic co=unity's relevant conception of distributive justice. See id. at
122-23. But see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
FREE TRADE 180-88 (1996). Such an argument, as Irwin suggests, depends upon the ade
quacy of the additional wealth generated from trade liberalization to more than compensate
the losers' loss of welfare. This means that the case that distributive justice can always be
achieved on the basis of trade liberalization depends upon empirical analysis of the costs of
those redistributive policies that would be dictated by a given theory of distributive justice,
as well as of the welfare losses that dictate those policies based upon the relevant theory of
distributive justice. For an attempt to conduct this analysis employing Rawls's difference
principle as a relevant distributive principle, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., TRADE
AND TRANsmONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES {1990).

4. See Frieder Roessler, Increasing Market Access Under Regulatory Heterogeneity: The
Strategies of the World Trade Organization, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT {OECD), REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL
MARKET OPENNESS 117-30 {1996).
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ligation of the GAIT with respect to domestic regulations is that they
be nondiscriminatory either between GAIT/WTO Members (Article
I: 1v1FN Treatment) or between domestic and imported products (Ar
ticle III:4: National Treatment). The nondiscrimination requirement
would seem to leave enormous room for domestic regulatory auton
omy;5 moreover, in those hard cases where some kind of discrimina
tory regulation is necessary for legitimate public policy purposes, it
might be justified under Article XX of the GAIT, which allows the
maintenance of otherwise GAIT-inconsistent measures that are, inter
alia, "necessary" for the protection of human or animal health or life
(XX(b)) or the protection of public morals (XX(a)).
Something like a nondiscrimination requirement would seem es
sential to sustain a trade liberalization bargain, even on tariffs and
other traditional "border" measures; if countries can "cheat" on trade
liberalization concessions by creating the same protective effect
through domestic regulations, then confidence in such a bargain will
likely be weak. The classic economic case for trade liberalization re
ferred to above tends to downplay such considerations, since that case
suggests that even unilateral liberalization is economically rational. In
as much as international trade law, however, reflects the notion that I
should expect a reciprocal benefit for a concession I confer on others
(even if it would have been in my interests to confer it absent the con
cession), some conventions about what constitutes legitimate domestic
regulation versus "cheating" on concessions seem to be required.
"Nondiscrimination" has proven to be a relatively robust convention
in this regard, because protectionism implies discriminatory treat
ment.6 Once discrimination has been extended, however, to include
disparate impact, or de facto discrimination, as it has been in GATT
jurisprudence, the nondiscrimination norm begins to seem like a less

5. In practice, as Roessler himself ad mits and as Trachtman d iscusses quite ex plicitly,
because nondiscrimination requires treating like prod ucts alike, how narrowly the nondis
crimination requirement constrains d omestic regulation d epend s upon which products are
d eemed " like. " For example, if a d omestic product that d oes not create an environmental
ex temality is d eemed to be "like" an imported prod uct that d oes create this externality,
these products would have to be treated id entically. Thus, this kind of und erstanding of like
products could greatly constrain the scope of legitimate regulatory activity. See Joel P.
Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 32, 65-67 (1998); see also Robert Howse, Comments on Roessler and Wilson Papers, in
OECD, REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS 165-68 (1996).
The Appellate Body of the World Trad e Organization has held that the d etermination of
whether products are "like" for purposes of the Article III nond iscrimination requirement is
to be und ertaken on a case-by-case basis, with the relevant factors d epending on context.
See Japan: Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996), at 19-21 [hereinafter Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages).
6. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
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stable criterion for distinguishing legitimate regulations from protec
tionist "cheating" on tariff and related concessions.7
III. SCIENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SPS AGREEMENT

On one view of the SPS provisions, requiring that regulations be
based on scientific principles and evidence and on risk assessment, ad
dresses the challenge of finding a criterion more stable than nondis
crimination by making "science" the authority that decides whether
reg�lations stricter than international standards are legitimate. This
approach, however, removes the ultimate power of decision from the
democratic communities that the regulations purport to protect.
Walker expresses this view as follows: "The central strategy of the
SPS Agreement is to use science to distinguish between those sanitary
measures consistent with the Agreement and those in violation of the
Agreement."8 Along similar lines, David Wirth suggests that "scien
tific tests lie at the core of the trade disciplines established in the new
Uruguay Round SPS Agreement."9 If one accepts this understanding
of the SPS Agreement then there is an inevitable cost to democracy in
protecting the trade liberalization bargain. If this cost to democracy is
genuinely required for trade liberalization, then the notion that liber
alization will generally maximize both domestic and global welfare be
comes questionable. One answer, which finds strong support in one
branch of the trade policy literature, is to say that, especially with re
spect to trade regulations, "democratic" outcomes typically reflect
capture of the regulatory process by concentrated interests. Thus,
hand-tying of the political process by international rules, or by an
apolitical authority such as "science," actually may enhance domestic
welfare and even result in regulatory outcomes that reflect more
closely the preferences of most citizens.10 Aside from the questionable
empirical basis for the "capture" thesis,11 there is another criticism: if
citizens place a value on the capacity for self-government, paternalistic
or technocratic responses even to admitted defects in the democratic
process may well not result in overall gains to democratic welfare.
7. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Di
versity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5,
21-22 (1998); see also Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International
Trade, 66 U. CID. L. REV. 1 (1999).
8. Vern R.Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organi
zation": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 3 1 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 251, 253 (1998).
9. David A. Wirth, The Role ofScience in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disci
plines, 27 CORNELLINT'L. L.J. 817, 825 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 3.
11. See generally Robert Howse et al., Smaller or Smarter Government?, 40 U.
TORONTO L.J.498 (1990).
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Another response is to argue that "scientific" constraints on demo
cratic regulatory choices be regarded as de minimus substantive re
quirements.12 Judgments by the WTO dispute settlement organs
about what constitutes de minimus scientific evidence, however, would
themselves entail substantive judgments of value concerning the
regulatory process, begging the question of which regulatory values
should determine the "minimum."
A quite different view of the role of science in addressing democ
racy's defects emerges, however, if one understands democracy not
simply in terms of popular will and decision, but as a form of legitima
tion of power that depends on a conception of public justification and
deliberative reason. Such an understanding of democracy is to be
found in several important accounts of democratic legitimacy in politi
cal and legal philosophy, notably those of Jiirgen Habermas13 and of
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.14 Gutmann and Thompson
provide four reasons why deliberation is a central element in demo
cratic legitimacy. First, deliberation can contribute to decisions made
under conditions of scarcity by displaying to those who lose that "eve
ryone's claims have been considered on their merits rather than on the
basis of wealth, status, or power."15 Second, deliberation may lead
citizens to take seriously the claims of others, thus enhancing demo
cratic equality. Third, deliberation may clarify what is really at stake
in disagreements between citizens, allowing, for instance, identifica
tion of conflicts that result from misunderstanding and misinformation
and that could be solved in fact without the need for trade-offs be
tween divergent fundamental values. Fourth, deliberation holds out
the prospect of learning from one another: "Through the give-and
take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives can
learn from one another, come to recognize their individual and collec
tive mistakes, and develop new views and policies that are more
widely justifiable."16
Gutmann and Thompson's version of the deliberative model of
democracy is not, however, uncontroversial. One issue arises from

12 See John T. Barcelo, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment - the
GAIT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 755 (1994); Wirth, supra note 9, at 856 (arguing, for instance, that the d ispute set tlement
organs, under the SPS provisions, should confine themselves to d etermining whether a chal
lenged measure "qualifies as minintally 'scientific' )
"

.

13. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSETHEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
14. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996).
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id.
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Gutmann and Thompson's17 own employment of certain moral princi
ples they regard as fundamental to simulating ideal deliberation on a
range of public policy issues, thereby reaching substantive policy con
clusions which they seem to believe have legitimacy regardless of
whether they are, or could be, adopted by citizens in a real delibera
tive process. Thus, Peter Berkowitz suggests:
What remains curious ... is just how much of their own deliberation the refinement of commonly held opinions, the intricate reasoning from
distilled moral principles, the sifting and weighing of the latest social sci
ence research - takes place without the actual involvement of fellow
citizens, in the comfort of the study and the congenial climate of the

seminar room; and to what an extent the legitimacy of the substantive
conclusions Gutmann and Thompson reach is, from the perspective of
their own principles, independent of whether their fellow citizens can be
persuaded to endorse them.18

A version of deliberative democracy that responds to this criticism
would respect citizens' real choices, even where these seem irrational
as measured against what citizens might be expected to decide in a
perfectly rational deliberative process, while at the same time seeking
to make the process as perfectly deliberative as possible.
The role of science on this understanding of deliberative democ
racy is developed by Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein: the appropri
ate role of scientific expertise in the regulatory process is not to trump
citizens' intuitive judgments about which risks are acceptable and
which not, but rather to help ensure that citizens' judgments result
from an appropriately structured deliberative process.19
As David Leebron suggests, the application of the traditional
GATT distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domestic regu
lations may entail a need for transparency in the domestic regulatory
process. Harmonization through international standards may be justi
fied where lack of transparency in the domestic regulatory process
makes it impossible to make a principled decision as to whether a
given regulation is legitimate or an example of illegitimate cheating on
trade liberalization commitments. As Leebron observes, "[i]f trade
liberalization commitments can be neutralized by disguised regulatory
measures, then the multilateral trade negotiation process would be
undermined."20 At the same time, as Leebron suggests, harmonization

17. It should be emphasized that Habermas's version of d eliberative d emocracy is not
vulnerable to the particular criticism that follows.
18. C. Sunstein & R. Pildes, Experts, Economists and Democrats, in C. Peter Berkowtiz,
The Debating Society, THENEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 1996, at 36-42.
19. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Pildes, Experts, Economists, and Democrats, in FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 128 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. , 1997).
20. David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 65
(Jagd ish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
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constrains the ability of governments to make distinctive rules for le
gitimate reasons, and he argues that the SPS Agreement should be
understood as a compromise or trade-off between these countervailing
concerns. One might develop Leebron's insight in the following way:
the SPS Agreement works on two fronts simultaneously: on the one
hand facilitating international harmonization as a solution to the
transparency problem, on the other hand seeking to reduce the prob
lem itself, through a range of disciplines on how governments engage
in deliberation and justification with respect to regulatory choices.
If these latter disciplines are interpreted largely in terms of delib
erative democracy, then it is possible to understand them in the "win
win" fashion in which nee-classical trade theory understands, for in
stance, tariff reductions or prohibitions on quantitative import restric
tions. On the one hand, the transparency21 in regulatory justification is
needed to distinguish "legitimate" policies from disguised cheating on
tariff and other concessions; on the other hand, the domestic regula
tory process is arguably improved or perfected in the direction of an
ideal of democratic rationality. Unlike harmonization, which implies a
trade-off between a greater democratic deficit and effective mainte
nance of the trade liberalization bargain, both democracy and free
trade should gain from disciplines that enhance democratic rational
ity.22
Yet, if one recalls Berkowitz's critique of the Thompson and
Gutmann model of deliberative democracy, things are not quite that
simple. Making real world democracy more rational is quite different
from constructing a model of democratic deliberation that purports to
tell us what citizens would or should decide if they were to deliberate
rationally given their existing preferences.
Moreover, since democracy is not just about citizens deliberating,
but also deciding and acting, there may be trade-offs within the notion
of democratic rationality between the need for timely and cost
effective action, on the one hand, and the desirability of more ade
quate deliberation, on the other.23 So if one wishes to understand the
SPS provisions as a "win-win" for democracy and free trade then one

21. It should be noted that in the GAIT and the SPS Agreement itself, "transparency"
is used as a term of art to d enote transparency in regulations and law themselves, i.e. notice
requirements. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trad e, Art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A·
11, T.l.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATf]; Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trad e Organization, Art. 7 and Annex B, reprinted in H.R. Doc No. 103-316, at 6981 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] . In this essay I employ transparency in a broader sense,
above all as transparency or publicity injustification.
.

22. Juliet Lodge d escribes the centrality of transparency concerns in critiques of the
d emocratic legitimacy of Union-level policy outcomes in the EU in Transparency and
Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 343 (1994).
23. On trad e-offs internal to d emocracy generally, see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE 45-48 (1999).
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must come to grips with this further dilemma. One way of doing so,
reflected as I shall argue in the decision of the Appellate Body in the
Hormones case, is to respect the manner in which these trade-offs are
themselves made within the democratic process of each Member, pro
vided that these trade-offs are themselves made explicitly, transpar
ently, and in a manner consistent with the conception of democratic
rationality. When regulators are acting without the information that
would be needed to inform rational democratic regulation, they
should say so and give a reason that is consistent with the conception
of democratic rationality itself; for example, that the best evidence of
citizens' preferences is such that the need to avert a possible catastro
phe through action outweighs the possible gains for democracy from
greater deliberation. Of course, here too matters are not so simple;
greater deliberation might change the very preferences that regulators
are "democratically" promoting in pushing ahead with action before
deliberation. But, from the free trade perspective, what will be impor
tant is that there be adequate transparency to permit a reasonable
judgment that the regulatory choice can be understood in terms of
such a legitimate trade-off. Nor can this element of transparency in
justification undermine democratic rationality within each Member
state (even if it will not solve all the internal conflicts of democracy for
that particular democratic community).
And, even if a deliberative process occurs where the requisite ele
ments of democratic rationality are present, citizens may not change
their views; once it is known that a risk is negligible or that there are
significant costs but few marginal benefits, and so forth, citizens may
still want a regulation to be enacted or maintained. As our considera
tion of Berkowitz's critique of Gutmann and Thompson suggests, in
such situations, not to honor the citizens' choice is in fact to favor an
artificial and cryptically elitist conception of democratic deliberation.
Yet even here, one could not plainly say that there is simply a trade
off between democracy and rationality; if citizens believe they need a
certain regulation, however "deluded" such a belief is, their utility will
be reduced if they do not get it, in the sense that they will believe
themselves exposed to a risk they believe to be significant.24 Yet, as
Steven Breyer suggests, part of the problem in these cases may be an
absence of trust in the information and judgments that expert regula
tor/bureaucrats feed into the regulatory process, and part of the solu
tion to distrust is "openness in govemment."25 This of course suggests
another "win-win" - enhanced transparency in justification can help
resolve dilemmas within democratic rationality, while at the same time
increasing confidence on the part of one's trading partners that they

24. See infra note 56 and accompanying text
25. STEVEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 81 (1993).
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are able to distinguish legitimate regulation from cheating on trade
concessions. Relatedly, openness can serve to enhance trust between
one's own regulators and those of other countries and can facilitate ar
rangements such as Mutual Recognition Agreements, which preserve
regulatory diversity, while reducing the transactions costs of trade
across borders.26
It is from this perspective that I will now consider the main opera
tive provisions of the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the WTO
Appellate Body.
IV. DEMOCRACY, TREATY INTERPRETATION, AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
The SPS Agreement is, of course, a treaty under the World Trade
Organization. Not all the Member countries of the WTO are democ
racies, either in the sense of displaying the formal institutional charac
teristics widely identified with democracy - free elections, multiple
political parties, legislative debate and so forth - or even in the gen
eral sense of providing means of public consultation and participation
in govemment.27 While an interpretation of the SPS Agreement in
formed by deliberative democracy might answer certain of the critics
of globalization, if this reading were not consistent with the structure
of WTO law in general and also with the international legal rules for
treaty interpretation, it would risk being characterized as illegitimate.
To address the critics, it would then be necessary to amend the actual
text of the SPS Agreement to make it explicitly reflect the democratic
values in question.28
The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the dispute settlement
procedures of the WTO to entail treaty interpretation based on the
rules to be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention).29 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides
26. Under such arrangements, each country can retain its own distinctive regulations,
while nevertheless allowing imports of goods and services to be sold in its market on the ba
sis of compliance with the exporting country's own regulations, which are deemed equivalent
in terms of protection of the public. As Kalypso Nicolaidis points out, such arrangements
necessarily require trust between the regulators of the importing and those of the exporting
country. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition ofRegulatory Regimes: Some Lessons
and Prospects, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD) , REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS 171-204
(1996).
27. As John Rawls notes, many countries without democratic institutions adequate to
satisfy a liberal conception of justice nevertheless have "decent consultation hierarchies."
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OFPEOPLES 61 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
28. For suggestions in this regard, see Steve Chamovitz, Improving the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in TRAD E, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM
171 (Gary P. Sampson & W.Bradnee Cambers eds., 1999).
29. See Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 5, at 10-12; United States: Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Report of the Appellate Body,
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that a treaty is to be interpreted in light of its purpose and object, and
its context, including the preamble.30 Additional sources of interpreta
tion include, inter alia, subsequent practice between the parties with
respect to the application and interpretation of the treaty, and any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.31 In the recent Shrimp/Turtle case, 32 which concerned a
potential conflict between trade liberalization and environmental
goals, the Appellate Body looked both to the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement - the framework treaty establishing the World Trade Or
ganization - and to evolving international environmental law in order
to interpret provisions of the 1947 GATT relating to trade action for
protection of exhaustible natural resources. This kind of interpreta
tion tends to integrate the GATT treaties into a dynamic system of in
ternational law as a whole.
It has been vigorously argued, most notably by Thomas Franck,
that democracy is an emerging right or norm in international law - a
right that entails not only participation in elections but is closely re
lated to rights of freedom of association and expression, which facili
tate democratic deliberation.33 In this broader context of the evolution
of international human rights law, interpreting those provisions of
WTO treaties that bear on domestic governance (like the SPS treaty)
in a manner that supports and encourages democratic governance
seems appropriate. Democratic governance is, however, increasingly
seen as instrumental to the achievement of objectives explicitly stated
as fundamental to the World Trade Organization. The Preamble of
the WTO Agreement lists as among these objectives, "raising stan
dards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income ..." and "optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with sustainable development.... " Some of
the best current economic thinking about development suggests that
such goals are very unlikely to be attained without democratic govern
ance. According to Amartya Sen, for example:
in judging economic development it is not adequate to look only at the
growth of GNP or some other indicators of overall economic expansion.
We have to look also at the impact of democracy and political freedoms
on the lives and capabilities of the citizens. It is particularly important in
this context to examine the connection between political and civil rights,

WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996), at 16-17; see also Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

30. See Vienna Convention, supra note 29, at Art. 31.
31. See id. at Art 31.3.c.
32. United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (especially para. 129).
33. See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. lNT'L
L. 46 (1992).
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on the one hand, and the prevention of major disasters (such as famines),
on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to
draw attention forcefully to general needs, and to demand appropriate

public action.... This is a part of the 'instrumental' role of democracy
and political freedoms.34

Openness and accountability of political and regulatory institutions
also has been identified by the World Bank as an important determi
nant of economic growth and development.35
The growing salience of democracy in relation to the objectives of
the international trading system, of course, does not provide a justifi
cation for interpreting the provisions of the SPS Agreement in a man
ner that does violence to the text of the treaty. Thus, following the
Vienna Convention, the cogency of an interpretation informed by
considerations of democracy must be tested against the language of
the treaty itself, and prior interpretations of the treaty by the WTO
dispute settlement organs. It is to these matters to which we therefore
now turn.
V.

"SUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE," "SCIENTIFIC"
JUSTIFICATION, AND RISK ASSESSMENT

Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement requires that Members ensure,

inter alia, that each SPS measure is "based on scientific principles and
is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."36 Measures
that "conform to" international standards, however, are deemed to
conform to this, as well as the other provisions of the SPS Agree
ment.37 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows Members to maintain
a higher level of protection than that which would be achieved by in
ternational standards if there is a "scientific justification."38
The meaning of scientific justification for purposes of the SPS
Agreement is explained in Article 5 of the Agreement: measures must
be "based on" a risk assessment, and the risk assessment "shall take
into account available scientific evidence" of risk, along with a range
of other factors including "ecological and environmental conditions. "39
In Annex A, risk assessment is defined as:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a

pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to
the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of

34. AMARTYASEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 150-51 (1999).
35. See generally WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
36. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 2.2.
37. Id. at Art. 3.2.
38. Id. at Art. 3.3.
39. Id. at Art. 5.5.
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the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease
causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.40

When read carefully, and in relation to one another, these provi
sions do not have the effect of usurping democratic judgment about
risk and its regulation and placing these matters under the authority of
"science." As language such as "based on" and "take into account"
suggests, the SPS Agreement brings science in as one necessary com
ponent of the regulatory process, without making it decisive. Thus,
"sufficient scientific evidence" arguably refers to the evidence that is
needed if science is to play this democratic role in risk regulation, not
to some threshold of scientific proof or certainty below which demo
cratic judgments about risk are illegitimate.
In the Hormones41 case, the Appellate Body tended toward this
kind of interpretation of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body
(AB) viewed the language "based on" in Article 5.1 as implying the
existence of a justified rational basis for a measure in assessed risks; a
measure still could be based on a risk assessment even if scientific
opinion were divided or uncertain.42 All that was required in the evi
dence represented by a risk assessment was evidentiary support for
the connection being drawn by the government between the measure
in question and the reduction or elimination of the identified risks. It
is worth citing the AB's analysis at length:
We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic
conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in
the SPS measure. The risk assessment could set out both the prevailing

view representing the "mainstream" of scientific opinion, as well as the
opinions of scientists taking a divergent view. Article 5.1 does not re

quire that the risk assessment must necessarily embody ollly the view of a
majority of the scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of

divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated
the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty.

Sometimes the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of scien
tific opinion, which may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most

cases, responsible and representative governments tend to base their
legislative and administrative measures on "mainstream" scientific
opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative govern

ments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be
a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. By it
self, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relation
ship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially where

40. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex A, para. 4.
41. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WfO Report of the
Appellate Body, Wf/DS26/AB/R, Wf/DS/48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones].
42 See Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 194.
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the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to con
stitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety. Determi
nation of the presence or absence of that relationship can only be done

on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all considerations ra
tionally bearing upon the issue of potential health effects.43

This interpretation of Article 5 suggests a number of important
implications. It should be noted, first of all, that the AB was here ad
dressing, at least explicitly, only one kind of uncertainty or indetermi
nacy, that produced by divisions of scientific opinion. The AB also in
dicated, however, that the "very existence" of divergent scientific
views may itself indicate that there is "scientific uncertainty."44 Here,
the AB seems to be referring to a different kind of "uncertainty"
which may, but need not be, manifested by disagreement among scien
tists, namely the degree of error or inaccuracy inherent in assessing
risk using scientific methodologies. The suggestion is that uncertainty
in this sense does not in itself prevent a measure from being based on
a scientific assessment of risk nor by implication, that it is being sus
tained without sufficient scientific evidence. The AB also suggests,
however, that when it is rational for a government to act in the pres
ence of a given level of uncertainty in the evidence will depend, inter
alia, on how serious the consequences of not acting would be, in terms
of harm to human health or economic interests, should the higher es
timates of the risk prove true. Of course, this cannot be a matter of
scientific judgment; science cannot tell us just how conservative or
protective it is reasonable to be in the presence of a given level of er
ror or uncertainty in a scientific assessment of risk. In a democracy,
this will depend on citizens' preferences about risk. But awareness of
the existence of uncertainty and margin of error, as well as knowledge
about the possible consequences of action or inaction, can allow citi
zens to determine the course of action most consistent with their un
derlying preferences about risk. To put it in terms of the language of
the SPS Agreement itself, each country may determine its "appropri
ate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection."45 Whether it is ra
tional for a government to take precautions in the presence of a given
degree or kind of uncertainty in the scientific evidence will ultimately
depend upon democratic judgments about the "appropriate level" of
protection.
The AB's democratic understanding of the role of "science" in
regulation is also exemplified by its statement concerning the range of
scientific views that may be taken into account, or even relied upon,
by regulators in a (democratically) rational regulatory process. The

43. Id. at para. 194.
44. Id. at para. 194 (emphasis added).
45. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5.
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AB suggests that this may include "nonmainstream" science. Now if
the range of views includes these, any sense in which science can be an
authority or neutral arbiter between legitimate and illegitimate poli
cies surely disappears - for this authority would depend upon the
authority of "science" itself to determine what constitutes science.
And what actual human authority could be found that might make this
judgment except the scientific "powers that be," namely mainstream
science itself - for whom nonmainstream science might be indistin
guishable from magic, shamanism, "superstition," and so on? The
democratic view of the place of science in regulation is, however, quite
compatible with a place for "nonmainstream" science; indeed, it re
flects an older view of the meaning of science: one that predates the
identification of "science" with the methodologies and techniques
characteristic of modern natural science - namely, that of reasoned
inquiry in the broadest sense.46 What is critical is whether the "sci
ence" in question can contribute to democratic rationality - transpar
ent deliberation about policy among citizens and their representatives
that does not exclude from consideration any reasoned claim.
Yet a further illustration of the democratic approach to the role of
science is the AB's rejection of a strict separation between risk as
sessment and risk management - the former based on quantitative
analysis of risks themselves and the latter involving judgments of value
as well as fact, in the determination of the best strategy to manage
risk.47 As the AB observed,

[i] t is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a
risk assessment ... is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory

operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human so
cieties as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for ad-

46. A meaning that is actually preserved in the range of ordinary meanings, for example,
of the German word Wissenschaft and the Russian expression nauke. See Jeremy D.
Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for
Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL L.J., 835, 857 (1998) ("[S]cientific analysis is valuable in a
democracy because scientific procedures are systematic and can be well-documented. When
decisions are made on a scientific basis, they are available for public inspection or review.").
47. For an explanation and critique, from the perspective of democratic regulation, of
separation of risk assessment and risk management, seeEllen K. Silbegeld, Risk Assessment
and Risk management: An Uneasy Divorce, in DEBORAH G. MAYO & RACHELLE D.
HOLLANDER, ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE MID VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 99
(1991). In a study of the regulatory consequences of an attempt to separate the performance
of risk assessment and risk management at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in the 1980s, Silbergeld concludes that such separation
is deleterious to sound operations and a sense of shared institutional authority and responsi
bility. When the scientists are restricted from access to policymaking processes based on the
implications of scientific choices (which are prominent in the resolutions of uncertainty),
they can only guess how their choices may affect policy. And policymakers, encouraged to
remain ignorant of science, may misinterpret uncertainty in some of the ways described in
this chapter.
Id. at 111- 12.
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verse effects on human health in the real world where people live and
work and die.48

Here, the issue was whether a risk assessment could take into account
risks that might arise from the use of the hormones in question in an
abusive fashion, contrary to sound veterinary practice. It was in fact
this kind of risk that played an important role in the public outcry that
had led to the EC ban in the first place.49 The Appellate Body never
theless held that the ban on hormone-injected beef violated the SPS
Agreement because the European Community had not offered a risk
assessment that dealt specifically enough with the risks posed by the
use of hormones in a manner inconsistent with sound veterinary prac
tice.
In the subsequent Salmon50 case, the Canadian government chal
lenged an import ban on fresh, uncooked salmon imposed by the
Australian government. The Australian government presented, as its
justification for the ban, a risk assessment contained in a 1996 docu
ment that found that, apart from heat treatment (which would amount
to the same thing as an explicit ban on fresh, uncooked salmon), the
scientific evidence suggested that no other means of preventing the
risk of the entry of disease agents would reduce the risk of disease to
an acceptable low. The risk assessment identified twenty-four diseases
that could . be spread through imported salmonids, with varying as
sessments of how likely this would be, depending on the disease in
question. For many of the diseases, the assessment suggested that
there was very limited evidence on the basis of which one could de
termine likelihood or probability, and in these cases a very general
nonquantitative estimate of the likelihood was given. In almost all
cases, the likelihood was low, but the possible social and economic
consequences of disease were claimed to be serious enough to justify
the maintenance of an import ban. This conclusion differed from that
of a 1995 Report that, having stated the probabilities as quite low, had
suggested that less stringent precautions might well be indicated.51
The panel considered the extent to which probabilities of risk
would have to be specified on a disease-by-disease basis, and asked

48. Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 187.
49. See VOGEL, supra note 2, at 156. While the consumers' groups accepted that proper
use of hormones might address the perceived carcinogenic or genotoxic risk from ingesting
hormone-fed beef, they believed that the difficulty of actually detected levels in processed
meat would preclude effective enforcement of a requirement of proper veterinary practice,
thus leaving a complete ban as the only feasible and effective regulatory measure.
50. Australia: Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Report of the Appel
late Body, WT/DS18/AB/R {Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body].
51. See Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, Import Risk Analysis, Disease
risks associated with the importation of uncooked, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon prod
uct from the United States and Canada {1995).
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scientific experts about whether, given the degree of specification in
the risk assessment, it qualified as such for purposes of the SPS
Agreement. The answers to these questions reflected considerable
confusion or uncertainty about what kind of "scientific" judgment the
scientists were supposed to be making. Some thought that only a
quantitative assessment could qualify for purposes of a risk assess
ment, while others found that nonquantitative statements were ac
ceptable where error levels or uncertainty made a quantitative ap
proach less feasible. In some instances, inferences across diseases
might be acceptable, presumably where the pathologies were roughly
similar; in other cases, it might be necessary to assess the diseases in
dividually in terms of risk of incidence from imported salmonids. The
panel concluded, weighing the various scientists' views, that, although
overall the Report seemed to fall short of the scientific ideal for risk
assessment, it did contain "some" evaluation of likelihood or prob
ability. Similarly, there was "some" evaluation of risk in light of the
alternative measures available to achieve Australia's appropriate level
of protection, but there was no systematic evaluation of the various
options and their relative effectiveness in reducing risk. The Appel
late Body, however, reversed this ruling, holding that, having made
findings of fact concerning these limitations of the risk assessment, the
panel could not properly have come to the legal conclusion that the
1996 Report qualified as a risk assessment within the meaning of the
SPS Agreement.
In the questions that it posed to the scientific experts, however, the
panel never placed the issues in the context of the legal meaning of the
SPS Agreement provisions on risk assessment and scientific evidence.
Thus, it asked the experts, inter alia, "what, in your view, are the
minimum requirements of a risk assessment? Would requirements
vary depending on the product and/or diseases addressed? . . . do these
reports, from a technical/scientific point of view, meet the minimum
requirements of a risk assessment generally accepted in the specific
area of aquatic animal health?"52 In asking these questions, the panel
must have believed either that a scientific/technical point of view
could be dispositive as to whether a risk assessment met the legal re
quirements of the SPS Agreement or that a judgment about adequacy
from a scientific point of view would be at least one element in deter
mining whether the risk assessment was adequate as a matter of law.
In the former case, the panel would have actually been ignoring the
important rulings of the Appellate Body, discussed above, namely that

52 Australia: Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Report of the Panel,
WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998), at para. 6.12 [hereinafter Salmon, Report of the Panel]. The
experts were: Dr. DavidE. Burmaster, Alceon Corporation, United States; Dr. Christopher
Rodgers, Fish Disease Consultant, Spain; Dr. James Winton, National Fisheries and Re
search Center, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, United States: Dr. Maron Wooldridge, De
partment of Risk Research, Central Veterinary Laboratory, United Kingdom.
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a risk assessment could contain views from "nonmainstream" science
and that for purposes of the SPS Agreement, risk assessment and risk
management are not necessarily to be viewed as separate or inde
pendent exercises. In the latter case, having considered the scientists'
evidence, the panel would have to make its own judgment as to how
that evidence bore upon the legal adequacy of the risk assessment.
The panel, in any event, did come to a conclusion of legal adequacy
after making findings of fact that suggested that, from the perspective
of mainstream scientists, there were elements of inadequacy in the risk
assessment. So, at one level, the Appellate Body erred in suggesting
that the panel's findings of fact were not consistent with its conclusion
of legal adequacy. But, at another level, the panel failed to articulate
how it intended to use or weigh the scientific evidence in deciding the
question of adequacy.
Interestingly, one of the scientists herself expressed some of the
reasons why one cannot determine the adequacy of a risk assessment
for regulatory purposes using technical/scientific criteria. In oral tes
timony, Dr. Wooldridge commented: "very often because time con
straints and requirements for action dictate that in the given circum
stances a qualitative assessment, which is generally much quicker, is
the thing that is required or the only thing that can be done."53 At the
same time, Dr. Wooldridge, testifying as a scientist, faulted the
Australian risk assessment for failing to undertake quantitative analy
sis of probability.54
In examining the entire record of scientific advice and testimony in
this case, the naive reader would take away the impression that the
scientists were terribly confused about what was required in a risk as
sessment from a technical/scientific point of view. For example, they
took quite varying views on the necessity for quantifying probabilities.
But even those who did not think a quantitative assessment need al
ways be done, strongly suggested, at other points in their testimony,
that it should be done whenever possible or feasible. Similarly, some,
but not all, of the experts appeared to believe that an assessment of
probability would be required for each disease; others hedged on this
issue. In fact, the scientists oscillated between their sense of what
would be required to meet a certain ideal of scientific knowledge
about probabilities, and their awareness that the context of the whole
question that was being posed to them, was practical - oriented to
wards political decision and action.
Significantly, none of the experts called by the panel was a regula
tory or political economist. It is arguable that the relevant "expertise"
that the panel needed in this case was the expertise of those whose re-

53. Salmon, Report of the Panel, supra note 52, at para. 56.
54. See id. at Annex 2, paras. 56-58.
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search centers on the role of science within the process of regulation
and who move between the disciplines of science and regulatory the
ory.ss The scientists called upon in Salmon were placed in a virtually
impossible position:
they were asked to make a purely techni
cal/scientific judgment about the adequacy of risk assessment as a
regulatory tool.
How then, in drawing on different kinds of expertise, might the
panel have been able to determine the adequacy of the Australian risk
assessment on a democratic rationality approach? The 1995 Draft
Report had stated relatively clearly the probabilities with respect to
transmission of disease and equally clearly the limits and assumptions
of those statements - many not based on actual historical data. The
probability was, in almost all cases, low or negligible. In light of these
results, the 1995 Report recommended consideration of options less
stringent than an import ban. The 1996 Report, of course, came to a
different conclusion: that considering the uncertainties surrounding
the assessment of probabilities in these cases, and given the politi
cal/regulatory decision to require a high level of protection, the import
ban remained a defensible and indeed desirable regulatory option. In
effect, the 1996 Report sought to justify more stringent regulation
based upon what amounted to much of the same evidence of very low,
or even negligible, risk. But, in restating the assessment of risks in
vaguer or more general terms, the 1996 Report, if it did not hide, at
least blunted the significance of a choice for stringent regulation in the
presence of negligible risks.s6 From the perspective of rational demo
cratic deliberation, the 1996 Report, therefore, left much to be de
sired. It impeded, rather than advanced, deliberation on the essential
question of whether there are democratically legitimate reasons for
choosing a very stringent regulatory option in the presence of findings
of low or negligible risk. In Hormones, the AB suggested that such a
decision might, in some circumstances, be rational, particularly in the
presence of various kinds of uncertainty about the finding that risk is
low or negligible and in light of a democratic j udgment on the conse
quences if, in actuality, the assessment proves much too low. It could
also be democratically rational in light of citizens' revealed risk pref
erences in the particular case, which relate to the appropriate level of
protection (an issue to be discussed in the next section of the Article).

55. For Breyer' s proposal on the role of interd isciplinary coord inators within the d omes
tic regulatory process itself, see BREYER, supra note 25, at 80-81.
56. The following claim of Viscusi seems to ad d ress the precise problem, from a d emo
cratic rationality perspective, with the 1996 Report: "tilti ng risk assessments in a conserva
tive d irecti on confu ses the informational and d eci si on aspects of research about risks. A
conceptually sound form of conservativism would have the d ecision maker (not the risk es
timator) adjust the weights on the consequences. Adjusting the probabilities amounts to lying
to ourselves about what we expect." W. KIP VISCUS!, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PuBLIC AND
P RIVATE REsPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 157 (1 992) (emphasis ad d ed).
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But such an inquiry into the rational relationship between the risk as
sessment and the measures adopted depends upon transparency about
the choices made and the assumptions about uncertainty and prob
ability that inform them.
The most recent interpretation of the SPS Agreement by the Ap
pellate Body, in Japanese Agricultural Products,57 appears at first
glance to endorse a rather narrow view of the requirements that
measures not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. In
Japanese Agricultural Products, the United States challenged a
Japanese requirement that, in order for plants to be permitted to enter
the country, it must be demonstrated that, with respect to the specific
variety of plant in question, quarantine measures such as fumigation
are effective to eliminate the risk of coddling moth, a pest that can
cause considerable destruction to crops. Japan had produced some
evidence from experiments that suggested the possibility that effec
tiveness of the quarantine treatments would vary from one variety of
host plant to another, and the scientific experts consulted affirmed
that such a relationship was possible.58 The panel found, however, that
Japan had not investigated the possibility of a link between the effec
tiveness of the quarantine measures and the variety of fumigated plant
studies that controlled for other variables. Thus, it concluded that "no
evidence before this Panel makes the actual casual link between dif
ferences in the test results and the presence of varietal differences."59
Upon appeal, Japan argued that the requirement of a "causal link"
went significantly beyond the requirement of a rational relationship
between the scientific evidence and the measures adopted, a relation
ship the AB held in Hormones was the appropriate interpretation of
the SPS provisions in question. The Appellate Body, however, upheld
the panel's finding of a violation in Japanese Agricultural Products,
noting that the "casual link" did not go to the relationship between the
regulations and the scientific evidence, but to the weight of the scien
tific evidence itself. The panel had made a finding of fact that, given
the absence of any evidence of a causal link between differences in va
rieties and differences in effectiveness of quarantine treatment, there
was not a rational relationship between the evidence and the SPS
measure adopted.60 Moreover, the Appellate Body explicitly rejected
the understanding of sufficient scientific evidence as a kind of de
minimus requirement that some scientific evidence exists.

57. Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Report of the Appellate
Body, WTIDS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japanese Agricultural Products].
58. See Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Report of the Panel,
WT!DS76/R (Oc t. 27, 1998), at § VII.F.2.b(ii).
59. Id.
60. See Japanese Agricultural Products, supra note 57, at § V.A.

Democracy, Science, and Free Trade

June 2000]

2349

How, then, do we understand the outcome of this case in light of
the democratic deliberation approach to the SPS Agreement, of which
we found considerable traces in Hormones? As the panel report indi
cates, Japan never really responded to the experts' view that it could
quite easily have done more to confirm the hypothesis that varietal
differences affect the efficacy of quarantine measures. Other than a
claim to deference, Japan never provided a justification for tabling its
investigation, even though the United States had raised a presumption
that the available science could yield much better evidence on the re
lationship in question, were the inquiry to be pursued. If the evidence
that Japan had were the best that was reasonably available, or if better
evidence would have resulted in large costs or inordinate delays in
regulation, Japan might have been able to supply reasons for acting on
the evidence which it had. In sum, Japan's choice not to pursue better
evidence did not reflect democratic rationality. "Sufficiency" of scien
tific evidence does not, then, refer to some threshold of scientific proof
or certainty (which, in any case, does not exist in the abstract) but
rather to the extent of the obligation of a Member to engage in scien
tific investigation within the process of rational democratic delibera
tion. And such sufficiency will be judged by the relative costs and
benefits acting on the scientific evidence that the Member has in fact
mustered as opposed to having taken the inquiry further. In this con
nection, it should also be noted that Japan had also attempted to jus
tify its regulation as a "provisional" measure, which can be undertaken
without sufficient scientific evidence, within the meaning of Article 5.7
of the SPS Agreement. Even Article 5.7, however, stipulates that in
order to qualify as a provisional measure, the Member must be mak
ing further efforts to obtain more accurate information and must re
view the measure within a reasonable period of time; it was held by
the Appellate Body that Japan's measure met neither of these condi
tions. This omission simply reflects what appears to be Japan's unjus
tified choice to truncate at a very preliminary stage its investigation
into the existence of the risk in question.
VI. APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF PROTECTION
The SPS Agreement provides that Members may introduce SPS
measures that provide a higher "level of protection" than international
standards,61 that, in determining their appropriate level of protection,
Members "should . . . take into account the objective of minimizing
trade effects,"62 and that "each member shall avoid arbitrary or unjus
tifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in dif-

61. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 3.3.

62 Id. at Art. 5.4.
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ferent situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or dis
guised restrictions on international trade."63 Furthermore, a Mem
ber's "appropriate level of protection" is defined as the level
"deemed" appropriate by that Member.64
The notion that distinctions in the level of protection in different
situations may be "arbitrary" and "unjustified" relates directly, of
course, to one of the main issues in risk-regulation literature: the
question of when it is rational or not for citizens to place a higher
value on given percentage chance of avoiding one risk rather than an
other.65 Summarizing important literature, Sunstein and Pildes suggest
the following:

For laypeople, many contextual features are relevant: 1) the catastrophic
nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether the
risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social conditions
under which a particular risk is generated and managed, a point that
connects to issues of consent, voluntariness, and democratic control; (5)
how equitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on identifi
able, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to both
notions of community and moral ideals; (6) how well understood the risk
process in question is, a point that bears on the psychological disturbance
produced by different risks; (7) whether the risk would be faced by fu
ture generations; and (8) how familiar the risk is. 66
Sunstein and Pildes further maintain: "It is fully rational to attend to
contextual differences of this sort."67
Even if one believes that in some strong sense citizens' distinctions
between risks along some of the lines listed above are not rational, it
may still, in some cases, make sense to "attend" to those distinctions.
The reason is that the utility from a regulation comes not only from
the reduced likelihood of an event that one disvalues, but also from
the psychological security that results from one's belief about the pro
tection one is receiving. As Viscusi notes, " [w]hen a federal agency
demonstrates that it will not take chances with individual health, that
reassurance alone enhances individual welfare. Conversely, a percep
tion that the government tolerates risks to the public might be more
damaging than the risks themselves."68
In Hormones, the AB considered the issue of which differences in
acceptable levels of risk could be considered arbitrary and unjustified
and which not. The complainants alleged several instances of arbi-

63. Id. at Art. 5.5.
64. Id. at Annex A, para. 5.
65. Compare, e.g., BREYER, supra note 25, at ch. 2 with Sunstein & Pildes, supra note 19.
66. Sunstein & Pildes, supra note 19, at 133.
67. Id. at 133.
68. VISCUS!, supra note 56 at 152.
,
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trary and unjustified distinctions between the levels of protection that
the EC deemed appropriate with respect to the synthetic hormones it
had banned and certain other substances it had not. Among the most
interesting of these claims was that while banning injected synthetic
and natural hormones, the EC had not attempted to control foodstuffs
in which comparable, or even significantly higher, levels of hormones
occur in nature.
Viscusi suggests that people tend to underreact to risks, including
cancer risks, presented by natural substances, while overreacting to
those produced by conscious human activity.69 The AB's response to
the panel finding of an arbitrary and unjustified distinction in protec
tion as between injected (natural and synthetic) and endogenous natu
ral hormones was as follows:

We do not share the panel's conclusions that the above differences in
levels of protection in respect of added hormones in treated meat and in
respect of naturally-occurring hormones in food, are merely arbitrary
and unjustifiable. To the contrary, we consider there is a fundamental
distinction between added hormones (natural or synthetic) and naturally
occurring hormones in meat and other foods. In respect of the latter, the
European Communities simply takes no regulatory action; to require it
to prohibit totally the production and consumption of such foods or to
limit the residues of naturally-occurring hormones in food, entails such a
comprehensive and massive governmental intervention in nature and in
the ordinary lives of people as to reduce the comparison itself to an ab
surdity.70
Yet does this reasoning really save the distinction in level ofpro
tection from being "arbitrary" or "unjustified"? Is it really true that
the EC does not regulate the level of endogenous hormone residues in
people's diets because of the vastly greater costs of such regulation, as
the Appellate Body suggested? Might it not also be possible that the
differential treatment of endogenous and injected hormones reflects
the kind of apparently irrational approach to risk described by
Viscusi? Yet another possibility is identified by Carl Cranor, namely
that there are morally defensible reasons for this kind of variation in
risk tolerance:

[I]t is one thing to die in a natural disaster, such as an exploding volcano
or an earthquake, and quite another to be a victim of a murder or of a
reckless or negligent release of a toxic substance. In each case the victim
is dead. However, human agency and human fault makes a difference in
our judgments of the issues. Morally faulty human actions are more

69. See w. KIP VISCOSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY: THE 1996 ARNE RYDE MEMORIAL
LECTURES 84-88 (1998).
70. Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 221 (footnotes omitted).
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blameworthy and frequently of greater cause of concern than acts of na
ture.71
If, however, citizens are acting on the basis of a simple mispercep
tion of relative risks, then the EC, by banning only synthetic hor
mones, is not only impeding rational democratic deliberation about
regulatory choice, but is also placing citizens at risk, allowing them to
draw the inference that a diet that does not consist of meat injected
with hormones is actually safe in terms of the risks at issue. The Ap
pellate Body is wrong that the EC would have to regulate endogenous
hormones through the same means as injected hormones, were the dif
ference in levels of protection found to be arbitrary or unjustified.
The EC might sensibly decide that it could respond to citizens' igno
rance of the relative risks posed by natural hormones through an ex
tensive public information campaign disclosing the carcinogenic risks
from the levels of residue in foodstuffs. It might still choose a ban as
its response to the injected hormones, based upon citizens' concerns
that because of problems with abusive veterinary practice they cannot
control the levels of these residues simply through dietary information
(which would be the case with the natural endogenous hormones).
In the subsequent Salmon case, the Appellate Body upheld a
finding by the panel that Australia had based its regulation on arbi
trary and unjustified differences in level of protection, resulting in
"discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on trade." In Salmon, it
will be recalled, Australia had banned salmon imports on the basis of
risk of transmission of pathogens through live or uncooked fish.
Australia did not, however, ban imports of bait fish, for which the risk
of transmission of disease was apparently even greater, nor did it ban
imports of tropical ornamental fish. Australia argued that it was im
proper to infer differences in level of protection from the mere fact of
different regulatory treatment of other fish presenting equal or even
greater risks of disease transmission. An examination of the record at
the panel level indicates, however, that Australia provided no alterna
tive explanation or justification for the difference in treatment, except
that it had not yet conducted risk analysis for these other fish. From
the perspective of democratic deliberation, was the Appellate Body
right to reject this explanation as consistent with the SPS Agreement?
By failing to conduct risk assessments across the range of comparable
risks, a government fails to assist its citizens in understanding the rela
tive costs of achieving a given level of protection in cases of different
risks. By its selectivity of which risk to consider regulating in the first
place, a government may reinforce popular prejudices about which

71. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND TIIE LAW 127 (1993).
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risks are serious or not.72 The Australian government was right to
point out that a government may not have the resources to study all
risks simultaneously.
Precisely by virtue of this fact, however,
Australia appropriately could be asked to provide an account of why it
had acted on salmon prior to bait fish, given that pre-existing general
scientific evidence suggested a strong prima facie case that the disease
threat from the latter was greater than from the former.
VII. NECESSITY AND LEAST TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEANS
There are at least two provisions of the SPS Agreement that ap
pear to be very difficult to understand in terms of the process of ra
tional democratic deliberation. These provisions would seem to re
quire certain substantive regulatory trade-offs and thereby to
constrain the outcomes of democratic regulation. Article 2.2 requires
that each member "shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health."73 One reading of this provision would
be that it requires that regulations be based on a demonstration that
less restrictive or less costly alternatives are not available for the pro
tection of human, animal, or plant life or health. This reading is con
sonant with Article XX(b) of the GATT, which provides that other
wise, GATT-inconsistent measures may nevertheless be sustained if
they are "necessary" to these purposes. GATT panels have inter
preted the concept of necessity here as implying the idea of least
restrictive means.74 In apparently excluding only regulations that are
superfluous or unneeded to achieve the legitimate public objectives in
question, such a concept may seem consonant with an unbounded
ability of the democratic community to make legitimate regulatory
choices. As Trachtman suggests, however, there are interpretations of
such tests that lead in practice to the imposition of substantive trade
offs between free trade and other public values. In recognition of the
fact that even if adequate to achieve the objectives in question, the
truly least restrictive means may have other costs, such as higher ad
ministrative or compliance costs than alternative measures; the least
restrictive means has been understood as that which is the least restric
tive "reasonably" available. As Trachtman observes:

72 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risk, in
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETIING BEITER REsULTS FROM REGULATION 135,
139 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); see also Fraiberg & Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 73-75.
73. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 2.2.
74. See, e.g., Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Truces on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991); GATT Dispute Panel Report on
U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M 1594 (1991).
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[I]f the reasonableness test amounts to a requirement that the least trade
restrictive alternative not be so costly as to countervail the benefits of the
regulatory measure, then it bears some resemblance to cost-benefit
analysis; excluding from its truncated maximizing analysis on the meas
urement of the benefits of the regulatory measure. If, alternatively, it
amounts to a comparison that requires that the regulatory costs not be
disproportionately great in comparison to the trade benefits, then it is a
kind of proportionality testing.75
It should be noted, however, that there is a significant difference
between Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article XX(b) of the
GAIT. The former deals only with the application of regulations, not
regulations themselves. Thus, the significance of Article 2.2 is argua
bly that it instructs those applying democratically decided regulatory
measures to do so in a manner consistent with the public justification
of the measures themselves. If read in this way, Article 2.2 is entirely
consistent with a democratic deliberation approach to the SPS
Agreement. Such a reading makes sense of the treaty language itself.76
Furthermore, many complaints about protectionism with respect to
food safety measures have related to the manner in which regulations
are applied or enforced through border inspections or other enforce
ment techniques. In Article XX of the GAIT, the parallel risk of pro
tectionism being embedded in application of measures is reflected in
the language of the chapeau, or preambular paragraph, which provides
that, where justified under a specific exception under Article XX, such
as XX(b ), measures must nonetheless not be applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on inter
national trade exists. In interpreting the chapeau of Article XX, the
Appellate Body has criticized a panel for ignoring the wording "ap
plied" and not distinguishing properly between constraints on the ap
plication of measures and on the justification of the measures them
selves.77
Much more difficult from the democratic deliberation perspective
is Article 5.6, which requires that "Members shall ensure that . . .
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility."78 A footnote to this pro
vision indicates that for a measure not to be the least trade restrictive,
another measure must be "reasonably available, taking into account
technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level
75. Trachtman, supra note 5, at 70.
76. See the careful parsing of the treaty provisions in Barcelo, supra note 12, at 768-70.
77. See generally United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod
ucts, WTO Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
78. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5.6 (footnote omitted).
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of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restric
tive to trade."79 An interpretation of these provisions that would be
largely consistent with a democratic deliberation-based approach to
the SPS Agreement is as follows: because Members have complete
autonomy to determine their level of protection, they are never pre
vented from regulating unless there is an alternative measure that
achieves entirely the same result, at equal or lower cost.80
John Barcelo illustrates the implications of this interpretation with
the following example:

Thus it would seem that if the United States were to set a policy of zero
risk from pesticide Z on apples, it would be entitled to ban the import of
apples containing only trace residues of pesticide Z. It is difficult to con
ceive a less-restrictive alternative measure that could fully and precisely
achieve that objective. If the U.S. purpose were to eliminate risk from
pesticide Z only, a crude ban on all pesticide residues of any kind on ap
ples would seem inconsistent with the least trade-restrictive requirement.
For example if there were a technically feasible, fully reliable, and inex
pensive test to detect only pesticide Z residue on apples, the Unites
States wold presumably have to use that test instead of banning all apples
with any pesticide residue. Such an outcome, however, would not com
promise the environmental protection goal in any way.81
Certainly, this interpretation of Article 5.6 is consistent with the
idea that the SPS Agreement is not about constraining the substantive
outcomes of a democratically rational policy process. The problem
with the interpretation is that it tends to render the provision mean
ingless altogether; a Member will simply set its "appropriate" level of
protection in such a way as to justify the particular measure in ques
tion as the least trade restrictive to accomplish that particular level of
protection. In fact, in one respect, the interpretation is harmful to the
conception of democratic rationality because it encourages the setting
of an appropriate level of protection in light of considerations other
than those reflecting citizens' considered judgments about the risks
they can tolerate. This concern is perhaps reflected in the Appellate
Body's rejection in the Salmon case of the notion that the appropriate
level of protection can or should simply be read back from the meas
ures that are under scrutiny:

We thus believe that the SPS Agreement contains an implicit obligation
to determine the appropriate level of protection. We do not believe that
there is an obligation to determine the appropriate level of protection in
quantitative terms. This does not mean, however, that an importing
79. Id. at Art. 5.6 n.3.
80. In this situation, there is no possible legitimate benefit from the more trade
restrictive measure. Indeed, there is a domestic cost, i.e. to consumers, from the trade
restrictive impact, and there is arguably no issue of balancing because no normatively legiti
mate claim could be made for the superiority of the measure in question.
81. Barcelo, supra note 12, at 763-764.
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Member is free to determine its level of protection with such vagueness
or equivocation that the application of the relevant provisions . . . such as
Article 5.6, becomes impossible.82
Relevant in this connection is Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement,
which provides that "[m]embers should, when determining the appro
priate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into account
the object of minimizing negative trade effects."83
The use of
"should," rather than "shall" (which denotes most other obligations in
the SPS Agreement) in this provision arguably denotes a lesser degree
of obligatory force. From a democratic rationality approach, this lan
guage is understandable; it makes clear that Members are not required
to make a substantive trade-off or to balance (for example on a pro
portionality basis) gains in protection of life or health against trade
restrictive impacts. But arguably what this obligation does mean is
that regulators must attend to the voices of those affected by the nega
tive trade impacts of regulation, not simply shut them out of the proc
ess of determining the level of protection. Such inclusiveness is not
only consistent with, but an important dimension of, rational demo
cratic deliberation. First of all, welfare losses from trade-restrictions
are borne not only outside but within the democratic community that
is regulating. Second, the wider the range of voices that have a say in
the regulatory process, the more likely certain kinds of errors and
misunderstandings concerning risk will be avoided. As Jonathan
Wiener and John Graham note, drawing conclusions from a variety of
case studies in risk regulation, " [o]ne prominent source of narrow de
cision-making is what one might call 'omitted voice': the absence of
affected parties from the decision process and the concomitant dispro
portionate influence of organized interests."84 Third, and more con
troversial, is the argument that, since deliberative democracy is not
only about the representation of the wills of those within the commu
nity but also about public justifications for policies based on moral
reasons, it is incongruous with democratic deliberation to exclude
moral claims that relate to the harm that may be done to outsiders
from a given policy. As Gutmann and Thompson suggest,

Representatives need not always, or even generally, pay as much atten
tion to the welfare of citizens of other countries as they do to the welfare
of the citizens of their own country. Representatives have enough trou
ble making public policies that deal adequately with our problems. For
most of the policies of the welfare state - from health care to unem
ployment insurance - representatives are probably justified, for reasons
82. Salmon, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 50, V.E.3.
83. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5.4.
84. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 230
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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of both competence and fairness, in giving priority to citizens of their
own country. But it is necessary that they be able to justify this priority
in each case (and that may be less easy to do than is usually assumed).
To the extent that representatives accept this burden of justification, for
eigners become moral constituents.85
VIII. CONCLUSION
The dynamic of globalization often appears to sacrifice democratic
politics to the demands for greater liberalization of trade. Indeed,
while they differ on whether it is desirable, both advocates and critics
of globalization see further trade liberalization as linked to regulatory
harmonization or reduced regulatory diversity. The foregoing analysis
of the provisions in the SPS Agreement, a set of liberalization stric
tures that arguably sacrifice democratic regulation to free trade, sug
gests that this kind of claim may require more careful scrutiny than
has hitherto been the case. Where there is a concern that domestic
regulations may constitute protectionist cheating on negotiated trade
concessions, an alternative to harmonization may well be to enhance
confidence in the ability to distinguish legitimate domestic regulations
from protectionist cheating. Requiring that regulations be defensible
in a rational, deliberative public process of justification may well en
hance such confidence, while at the very same time serving, not frus
trating, democracy. Further research might usefully explore the possi
bilities of this approach in other areas, such as trade and competition
policy, where there is considerable resistance by many states to har
monization, and good arguments against it.86 But claims of hidden
protectionism will not easily go away.

85. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 148.
86. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Trade Policy: Mediating the In
terface, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (1996).

